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To Foreign Minister Shidehara From Minister Shigemitsu

No.1022-1 (strictly confidential)

1. The recent action of the military was based on their conception of the Emperor's prerogative of supreme command, and was taken entirely ignoring the Government. Deep is my feeling to see that whatever achievements in external affairs resultant of our untiring efforts have been all of a sudden reduced to nothing. I am profoundly distressed to think of the future of the nation.

In this situation, it is most earnestly desired that arbitrary actions of the military should be interdicted so as to make the will of the State emanate solely through the channel of the Government, that irresponsible and disadvantageous propaganda of the military circles should be stopped, and that, making its stand clear, the Government should reestablish political leadership.

2. No sooner has the Chinese side found the seriousness of the situation than it has as usual decided upon tactics of non-

resistance, so far as military actions are concerned, and has adopted all possible counter-measures short of military actions. Not only the unified leadership of the Party and the Government, but also all the anti-Japanese organizations which have already been well trained have begun their activities. Economic boycott may be less abominable, but in my opinion, the students of the whole country, who did not move at the time of the unrest in Korea, may be active and will wield most serious influences, and anti-Japanese feeling will be brought to a higher pitch than at the time when it was instigated by the so-called Twenty-One Demands, and will be more and more aggravated with time.

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To Foreign Minister Shidehara From Minister Shigemitsu

No.1022-2 (strictly confidential)

As the matter stands to-day, there is no foretelling that unpropitious incidents will not happen outside Manchuria. (In this regard, I request the Government to call full attention of our Navy in no case whatever to move recklessly). Should our troops by any chance advance into North Manchuria, a clash with Russia would immediately be surmised, and that will make the situation ever more serious. (I conjecture that this may be part of the plan of the military).

3. The Chinese Government will follow its traditional policy of controlling one foreign country through another, with unified force by quickly settling internal strife, (the compromise pending with Canton being now accelerated in earnest with possibilities to be realized at last). The policy of the Chinese Government will be first of all to appeal to the League of Nations (with which China now stands in closer relations owing to T. V. Soong's approach to it), and to rely upon the United States by reason of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as well as upon the effect of propaganda at home and abroad, trying thus to force evacuation of the Japanese troops in exactly the same manner as she tried for the restitution of Shantung. In any case, no Chinese authorities will appear

hereafter which will be able to conclude any reasonable agreement with Japan on the Manchurian question, or to begin negotiations for that purpose. Consequently we shall have to be prepared to see Japan and China in fact deprived of diplomatic relations for a long time as a result of the present incident, which also will have to remain exposed to censure of world public opinion, due to activities on the part of the Chinese Government.